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and Free Trade: Are They
Mutually Exclusive?
Having to compete in the United States in a totally free market atmosphere with
companies and countries who have yet to develop such environmental standards is
inherently unfair. It puts us into a game where the unevenness of the rules almost
assure that we cannot win or even hold our own.
James E. Hermesdorf, Testimony to Senate Finance Committee
on Trade and the Environment, October 25, 1991.
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3LAOMMENTS LIKE THE ONE cited above are
being heard with increasing frequency. In fact,
protecting the environment has always had im-
plications for international trade. In 1906, for
example, the United States barred the importa-
tion of insects that could harm crops or forests.
Similarly, the Alaska Fisheries Act of 1926 estab-
lished federal regulation of nets and other fish-
ing gear and made it illegal to import salmon
from waters outside U.S. jurisdiction that violat-
ed these regulations- More recently, a U.S. law
restricting the method of harvesting tuna to
protect dolphins has been the subject of a trade
dispute between the United States and Mexico.
In recent years, as global warming and other
environmental concerns have multiplied, en-
vironmental issues have played an increasing
role in trade negotiations, further complicating
what are generally difficult negotiations.
Negotiating environmental regulations mul-
tilaterally is especially problematic because of
differences in preferences and income levels
across countries. What’s more, scientific evi-
dence is not always conclusive on the effects of
certain types of environmental degradation.
Finally, environmental considerations can be
used to disguise protectionist policies.
This paper examines the different ways
environmental policy can have international
ramifications and their implications for interna-
tional trade and international trade agreements.
A general introduction to environmental eco-
nomics is given, followed by an analysis of the
relationship between environmental policy andinternational trade. The paper concludes with a
discussion of the status of environmental con-
siderations in multilateral trade agreements.
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The environment is used primarily in three
ways: as a consumption good, a supplier of
resources and a receptacle of wastes.’ These
three uses may conflict with one another. For
example, using a river as a receptacle of wastes
can conflict with its use as a supplier of re-
sources and as a consumption good.2 When
either the production or consumption of a good
causes a cost that is not reflected in a market
price, market failures that are termed “external-
ities” may exist.’ Such market failures frequent-
ly involve the environment.
A. C. Pigou, in The Economics of Welfare
(originally published in 1920), presented one of
the classic examples of an externality. In the
early 1900s, many towns in Great Britain were
heavily polluted by smoke coming from factory
chimneys. Laundered clothes hung outside to
dry were dirtied by the smoke. A study done in
the heavily polluted city of Manchester in 1918
compared the cost of household washing in that
city with that of the relatively cleaner city of
Harrogate. According to the Manchester Air Pol-
lution Advisory Board:
The total loss for the whole city, taking the ex-
tra cost of fuel and washing materials alone,
disregarding the extra labour involved, and as-
suming no greater loss for middle-class than for
working-class households (a considerable under-
statement), works out at over £290,000 a year
for a population of three quarters of a million.~
Thus, a by-product of production—smoke—
unintentionally had a negative effect on another
economic activity—clothes-washing.
Externalities exist when the social cost of an
activity differs from the private cost because of
the absence of property rights. In the preceding
example, because no one “owns” the air, the
factory does not take into account the extra
washing costs it imposes on the citizens of the
town. As a result, more pollution than is socially
optimal will occur because the private cost of
the smoke emissions to the firm (zero) is lower
than the social cost (fl90,000 a year). In gener-
al, if nothing is done about negative externali-
ties, environmental damage will result as
ecologically harmful products are overproduced
and the environment is overused.
To eliminate externalities, the divergence
between the social and private costs must be
eliminated, either by assigning private property
rights (that is, ownership rights) or by direct
government regulation. The approach taken often
depends on whether property rights can be
assigned.’ The advantage of assigning property
rights to an externality isthat it creates a market
for that product and allows the price mechanism
to reflect the value of the externality.
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Suppose a chemical factory locates upstream
from a small town and emits waste into the
river as part of its production process. Suppose
further that the town uses the river as its
primary source of water. As a result of these
emissions, the town must process the water
before use. Clearly there is an externality
associated with the firm’s use of the water—it is
no longer usable to the town without cost. If
property rights to the river could be assigned to
either the town or the firm, then the two par-
ties could bargain for the most efficient level of
pollutants in the water.
‘There are many definitions of what constitutes the
environment and therefore what is environmental damage.
Production pollution results from the act of producing a
product. Consumption pollution arises when the act of con-
suming a product causes pollution. Deforestation reduces
both the capacity of the earth to naturally process carbon
dioxide and biological diversity. Elimination of a biological
species also has environmental implications. Other things
that have environmental consequences include product
safety standards (such as limiting chemicals that can be
used in agriculture) and soil erosion. This paper, unless
otherwise noted, focuses on production pollution, the
source of many trade-related disputes.
2For a more detailed discussion of these problems, see Sie-
bert (1987).
‘This paper focuses only on negative externalities. Positive
environmental externalities occur when one use of the en-
vironment costlessly enhances another. For example,
cleaning a river for recreational use could also increase its
function as a supplier of fish.
4Pigou (1952), p.185, footnote 18.
5Even if they can, social mores or standards may prevent
such an assignment. For example, people might be op-
posed to selling timber companies the property rights to all
trees in national forests.S
If property rights are assigned to the firm, the
town pays the firm to reduce its pollution. The
town’s willingness to pay for reduced levels of
pollution depends on the benefits it receives from
cleaner water. Generally speaking, as the water
becomes more pure, the additional (marginal)
benefits to the town likely decrease. On the
other hand, the firm’s willingness to reduce pol-
lution depends on the costs it incurs to reduce
pollution by, for example, changing to a more
costly production or waste-disposal method.
Generally speaking, as the firm pollutes less, the
additional (marginal) costs to the firm increase.
The amount of pollution agreed upon will be
such that the added benefits to the town of a
further reduction in pollution are less than the
added costs to the firm of the further reduction.
If property rights are assigned to the town,
on the other hand, the firm pays the town to
pollute. The firm’s willingness to pay for the
right to pollute depends on the benefits it
receives from polluting. These benefits are
directly related to the costs it incurs from using
a more costly production or waste-disposal
method. Similarly, the town’s willingness to sell
pollution rights depends on the costs it incurs
from additional pollution. The amount of pollu-
tion agreed upon is where the additional benefits
to the firm of increasing pollution are less than
the additional costs to the town of additional
pollution.
The Coase theorem proves that the equilibri-
um level of pollution is the same in the preced-
ing cases. Furthermore, such an outcome is
efficient.°Thus, when property rights are clear-
ly defined and there is an explicitly designated
polluter and victim, the efficient outcome is
independent of how the property rights are
assigned.
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The key result of the Coase theorem, that the
allocation of property rights does not affect the
efficient amount of pollution, has limited appli-
cation. If there are multiple polluters and/or
many parties affected by the pollution, the out-
come can depend on how property rights are
assigned. Similarly, if there are significant trans-
actions costs, such as measurement and enforce-
ment costs, the Coase theorem may not hold!
Assume, for example, that two towns are
affected by the factory’s emissions, one further
downstream than the other. Suppose that the
town further away from the chemical plant has
lower costs associated with cleaning the water.
In this case, the amount of compensation the
towns would he willing to pay to reduce emis-
sions by any given amount would differ. Thus,
the allocation of property rights among the firm
and the two towns would affect the outcome of
their bargaining.
Suppose, instead, that more than one firm is
polluting. Determining how much pollution is
coming from each firm, along with ensuring
that each firm lives up to any agreement, may
be difficult and costly. If monitoring costs are
high, the Coase theorem may not hold and the
allocation of property rights again affects the
choice of optimal emissions.
The lack of general applicability of the Coase
theorem is not an indictment of using market-
oriented incentives (which usually requires
assigning property rights). Most economists
believe that market-oriented solutions will lead
to the most efficient use of resources because,
rather than having the government attempt to
estimate preferences, it allows the market
mechanism to reveal them.
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Property rights are not always assigned because
many uses of the environment are considered
public goods. A pure public good is one that has
two qualities: First, it is impossible or extremely
costly to exclude people from the benefits or
costs of the good (non-excludability). For exam-
ple, even if a person does not contribute to
cleaning the air, she still cannot be excluded
from breathing the cleaner air. Second, the con-
sumption of the good by one person does not
diminish the amount of that good available to
someone else (non-rivalry). For example, the fact
that one person is breathing clean air does not
reduce the amount of clean air others breathe.
In this case, property rights cannot be assigned
because rationing is impossible.
6See Coase (1960). An (Pareto) efficient outcome is one in
which no one can be made better off without making
someone else worse off. This type of economic efficiency,
however, provides no information or guidance regarding
equity issues. For a graphical analysis, see Nicholson
(1985).
‘For a discussion of the limitations of the Coase theorem,
see Baumol and Oates (1988).While few uses of the environment are pure
public goods like air, many have enough fea-
tures of non-excludability and non-rivalry to
make assigning property rights virtually impossi-
ble. The functions of the environment that are
public goods, such as breathable air and clean
water, are summarized by the term environmen-
tal quality.
Regulating environmental quality is difficult
because the government first needs to deter-
mine the public’s demand for environmental
quality before deciding the efficient level of pol-
lution. The free-rider problem that occurs with
public goods makes this determination especially
difficult. When people cannot be excluded from
use, they have an incentive to understate their
willingness to pay for environmental quality
because they can gamble that others will be
willing to pay. Similarly, if they are asked their
preferences and know they will not have to
pay, people have an incentive to overstate their
desire for a given public good. The degree to
which free-riding is a problem depends on the
size of the non-rival group affected. The larger
the group, the greater the free-rider problem.~
For the purposes of this paper, we will
assume that to determine the “true” value of
public goods, the government measures the
costs of pollution reduction and the benefits of
pollution abatement accurately.° Using a cost-
benefit approach, the optimal outcome is where
the marginal cost of pollution reduction equals
the marginal benefit of pollution abatement.’°
It is important to recognize that the socially
optimal level of pollution is generally not zero.
Achieving zero pollution would require an
extremely low level of production or an extreme-
ly high cost of pollution control. In determining
the optimal amount of pollution, both the costs
to individuals and industry need to be taken
into account.”
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Recall the previous example of a firm emitting
pollutants into a river. Suppose the government
decides to regulate the industry because there
are too many polluting firms on the river to
define property rights adequately.” After deter-
mining the socially optimal level of pollution,
the government imposes a per-unit tax on emis-
sions to reduce pollution to the optimal level.”
What happens to production? Figure 1 shows
the supply and demand curves for the indus-
try’s output. The effect of the tax is to shift the
supply curve the distance AB (the additional
per-unit cost of output given the new tax).” The
price rises from P, to P,, and the quantity of
output falls from Q, to Q, which is the output
level associated %vith the efficient emission lev-
el” Emissions are reduced and environmental
quality improves.
8How to avoid this problem is the source of vast literature
in economics and is not discussed in detail here. For a
discussion of the free-rider problem in valuing public
goods, see Browning and Browning (1983), or any other
public finance textbook.
°Significantproblems face governmental agencies trying to
determine the optimal amount of environmental quality.
For a discussion of these issues, see Baumol and Oates
(1988), Siebert (1987), and Anderson and Blackhurst
(1992). For an evaluation of how successful current
methods are in the United States, see OECD (1991).
“For a more detailed study of cost-benefit analysis, see Mi-
shan (1971).
‘1While it is difficult for many people to think of placing a
monetary value on health and life, in reality it is done all
the time. For example, though many lives are lost in cars
each year, people are not willing to pay the - ‘costs” of
outlawing cars to save those lives. For an excellent discus-
sion of this issue, see Blackhurst (1977), footnote 18.
‘2For simplicity, we assume all firms on the river produce
the same product and constitute the entire industry. This
analysis can be generalized, but it greatly complicates the
graphical analysis.
“This analysis assumes that the cost of reducing pollution
per unit is the same across firms in this industry. One
problem with imposing a per-unit tax, however, is that the
cost of reducing pollution can vary significantly across
firms. One innovative approach to finding the most effi-
cient way to reduce pollution to a given level is the trading
of emission permits. In this case, the government decides
the maximum amount of each type of pollutant that can be
emitted overall and distributes permits to firms, allowing
them each a certain level of polluting emissions. The per-
mits can be traded among firms, which allows firms to use
firm-specific information to set their own level of pollution.
This enables firms for which installing pollution controls is
relatively inexpensive to sell emission permits to firms that
find it more expensive to install pollution-reduction
devices. For a discussion of the theory of emission trad-
ing, see Tietenberg (1990) and Nicolaisen, Dean and
Hoeller (1991). For a discussion of the effectiveness of
emission trading in the United States, see OECD (1991).
‘~This assumes that the per-unit emissions tax increases the
cost of production proportionately.
‘5Other means of reducing pollution, such as a tax credit for
pollution reduction, may not result in lower output in the
industry.Figure 1




Pollution can have international effects in two
ways. First, it might be localized within national
boundaries hut, through the impact of environ-
mental policy, affect a country’s international
trade. On the other hand, pollution may he
transported across borders without the consent
of the countries affected (so-called transfjontier
pollution). These two types of environmental
damage have different effects on international
trade and, therefore, are discussed separately.
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Countries trade because of differences in
comparative advantage. The idea of comparative
advantage suggests that, given demand, coun-
tries should export products that they can
produce relatively cheaply and import products
for which they have a relative cost disadvan-
tage. Traditional international trade models ig-
nore externalities such as non-priced uses of the
environment.
By not explicitly including the environment as
a factor of production, the costs associated with
using the environment are ignored. More recent
economic models have extended the definition
of factors to include assimilative capacity, that is,
the capacity of the environment to reduce pollu-
tants by natural processes. The degree to which
the environment will he affected by its use or
by the production of ecologically harmful
products depends on its assimilative capacity.
The higher the assimilative capacity, the less the
environmental damage caused by the emission
of a given amount of pollutants. Assimilative
capacity can differ across regions and countries
and thus is an important factor in determining
the effects of environmental use on trade.
Traditional trade models also ignore the non-
priced use of the environment as a consumption
good. This underestimates the value consumers
may place on the environment and therefore
the cost of using the environment for other
functions. These two factors can be significant
in determining a country’s comparative advan-
tage.’°
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Assimilative capacity is one of the principal
factors affecting a country’s choice of environ-
mental quality. In general, assimilative capacity
is lower in industrialized countries because of
the effects of past pollution. Less-industrialized
countries often have greater assimilative capaci-
ties and thus can tolerate a higher level of emis-
sions without increasing pollution levels. Popula-
tion density and geography also affect a coun-
try’s assimilative capacity. For example, the in-
troduction of a polluting industry in a sparsely
populated area, all else equal, will likely not af-
fect the assimilative capacity of that area as
much as it would in a densely populated area.
Other factors can also affect a country’s will-
ingness to accept environmental degradation.
leflecently some have suggested that the United Nations
change its system of national accounts to take into
account environmental resources. This can be particularly
important for countries like Costa Rica that have large en-
vironmental resources (see “Wealth of Nature,” January
18, 1992). A different system of national accounting could
take into account the costs of irreversible environmental
destruction, so that, for example, the costs (as well as the
benefits) of rapid deforestation are accurately reflected in









For example, poor countries may put a higher
priority on the benefits of production (such as
higher employment and income) relative to the
benefits of environmental quality than wealthy
countries. As income levels increase, however,
demandfor environmental quality also rSs1’
Thus, countries with similar assimilative capaci-
tiesmight choose different levels of environmen-
tal quality. As the example below demonstrates,
environmental policies that result from differ-
ences in countries’ preferences and income levels
can have significant trade effects.
Environmental Policy When Pollu-
tion Is Within National Boundaries
How does environmental policy affect trade?
Recall that, in the emissions tax example, the
higher production costs that resulted from the
tax caused the price of the industry’s output to
increase and the quantity produced to fall.
Assume there is a chemical industry in another
country producing the san-rn product with the
same level of emissions. For simplicity, assume
that, prior to the implementation of environ-
mental controls, each industry produced just
enough to meet its home demand, and the price
was the same in both countries. As a result,
trade did not occur1t Suppose, because of
different preferences, income levels or assimila-
live capacity, it is optimal to impose environ-
mental controls in one country butnot in the
other. What happens to price, output and en-
vironmental quality in the two countries?”
The answer depends in part on whether the
two countries can trade. If trade does not
occur, the effect is the same as in the previous
example. As figure 1 shows, in the country
where pollution controls were imposed, the
price will rise to P3 and the quantity of output
will fall to Q2, while in the other country noth-
ing changes. Figure 2 shows the effect of an
emissions tax on price and output in the two
countries when trade occurs.2’ The reduction in
supply of the chemical in the taxed country
(Tax) will reduce the world supply of that
product, causing the world supply curve to shift
upward to the left. At the new world equilibri-
um D, the price, P3, is lower than the autarkic
(no trade) equilibrium price in Tax (P3), but
higher than the autarkic equilibrium price in
the other country, Notax (P.). At P,. consumers
in Notax demand Q, but firms are willing to
supply C),- The distance ~2 is exactly equal to
the distance X1, which measures the difference
between what firms in Tax are willing to supply
at P3 (Q) and what consumers demand at that
‘t$ee, for example, Grossman and Krueger (1991)
leThs example generalizes to the case where trade occurs
before the implementation of eSronmental controls.
lamis section assumes that each country is large enough to
affectthe wodd price If the countrywith the emissions tax
was a small country, it could not affect thewodd price. As
a result, the effect on output in that country would be
greater than in the example above
~‘Thls assumes prices are in the same currency, so all ex-
change rate effects are ignored.
FIgure2
The Effectof at EmissIon. Tax on Industry Price and Output In a Two-Country Wcdd













a’ ~, — ------ -- ——a
price (0). As a result, Notax exports the quanti-
ty X2 of the chemical to Tax.
What Is the effect on other economic varia-
bles? Consumption of the chemical falls in
Notax, even though output rises. In general,
because of the increased production in Notax,
there will be an increase in pollution emissions
in that country. How much the pollution level
actually increases in Notax (if at all) depends on
the assimilative capacity and the method of
production usedin that country. Whether the
people in Notax are better off at the potentially
higher level of pollution that resulted from
increased production depends on that country’s
willingness to accept higher pollution for higher
income.
Pollution declines in Tax. Ifthe assimilative
capacity is higher in Notax, world pollution will
likely be lower after environmental controls are
Implemented. The effect on world employment
is ambiguous and depends on certain country-
specific variables. The terms of trade will de-
teriorate for the country with the emissions tax.
If the new level of emissions in each country
is optimal given preferences and income, both
countries are better offby trade- The taxed
country is able to consume more at a lower
pricethan in the autarkic case, while the value
of total output rises in Notax. If measures of
national income or wealth accurately reflected




One concern is that environmental regulation
unfairly discriminates against domestic firms
when they compete with firms in a country
that has lower environmental standards. In the
example discussed above, an externality existed
in Tax but by assumption, not in Notax. As a
result, introducing environmental controls elimi-
nated a distortion that previously existed. This
changed the flow of trade, but caused all the
costs of using the environment, both as inputs
in production and as consumption items, to be
reflected in market prices. Thus, assuming that
environmental quality was not socially optimal
before protections were enacted, pollution-inten-
sive sectors in Tax were actually receiving an
implicit subsidy from those who had been in-
curring the external costs of pollution.
The difficulties in trying to determine the
optimal amount of environmental quality within
a country, as discussed above, are substantial.
The optimal level of environmental quality in
one country is unlikely to be optimal in another,
particularly if the two countries have signifi-
cantly different income levels. Attempting to
Impose one country’s environmental standards
on another by using import restrictions does
not allow countries to capitalize fully on their
comparative advantage3’ As discussed later,





The previous section discussed the interna-
tional effects of environmental policy when
environmental damage is contained within
national borders. Many other uses of the
environment cause environmental damage
across borders, such as acid rain, which results
from sulphur dioxide emissions, or worldwide,
such as ozone depletion, which results primarily
from chlorofluorocarbons (CPC5). Transfrontier
pollution may occur in essentially four ways:~
1. A firm’s production takes place in one
country, but pollutes only in another.
2. Both countries have firms whose produc-
tion processes pollute, but each country’s
pollution is experienced only in the other
country.
3. Pollution occurs as a result of production in
one country butthe effects are felt in both
countries.
4. Both countries pollute, and the pollution
generated by each is felt in both countries.
21ft Tax puts trade restrictions on imports ofchemicals from
Notax because of the lack of emission restrictions in No-
tax, both countries would be worse off. It for example, a
tariff was levied against imports from Notax, the earnings
In Notax from exposling the chemicals would be tower.
Consumers In Tax would pay a higher price and Import a
lower quantity as a result ofthe tariff. For a detailed dis-
cussion of the effects oftariffs on trade, see Coughlin,
Chrystal and Wood (1988). For a discussion of the possi-
ble application of trade and polIcy measures in relation to
environmental problems, see Subramanlan (1992).
~SeeLloyd (1992).If pollution is of form 1 or 2, in the absence
of an international agreement, the polluting
country has no incentive to curtail its polluting
activities by implementing an environmental
policy. If, instead, pollution is of the form 3 or
4, pollution may be regulated domestically.
Without taking into account the pollution in the
other country, however, these controls will not
likely be optimal internationally. In the absence
of a globally optimal international agreement,
domestic policymakers have less incentive to
take into account the costs imposed on a for-
eign country than if the costs were borne
domestically. Thus, from a global perspective
there will be excessive use of the environment.
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Suppose, as in case 1, the river being polluted
by the chemical firm runs directly into another
country and all the towns affected are in the
foreign country. How is an appropriate policy
determined? Previously, we assumed that a
country weighed the costs and benefits of pollu.
tion, given its preferences for environmental
quality, its income level and its assimilative
capacity. Unfortunately, in the case of trans-
frontier pollution, this is no longer sufficient. In
this case, domestic policymakers will be less
concerned with the costs imposed on a foreign
country than those borne domestically. In addi-
tion, the desired level of pollution could differ
significantly between the two countries because
of their preferences and income levels. Other is-
sues contribute to the difficulties in negotiating
an international agreement on pollution control.
For example. should the polluter pay to reduce
emissions or should the residents of the country
affected by the pollution pay to induce the t’irm
to reduce emissions?
In the early 1970s, countries belonging to the
Organization of Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD), the multilateral organiza-
tion of the industrialized countries, adopted the
Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) to deal with purely
domestic pollution.” This principle requires that
the polluter bear the cost of pollution-reducing
measures. This approach, hmvever, provides no
guidance about how to determine environmen-
tal damage or what to make the polluter
responsible to pay for. For example, should a
polluter be responsible for damage that has
already occurred, or should it be required only
to pay to reduce current emission levels? in
addition, PPP offers no instruction regarding
transfers between governments to resolve
problems of transfrontier pollution.
As a result of an OECD conference on trans-
frontier pollution, it was suggested that the
OECD adopt the so-called “mutual compensation
principle.” This proposal requires the polluting
country to provide an estimate of the costs of
pollution abatement for various levels of pollu-
tion, while the polluted country similarly pro-
vides an estimate of the costs of treating the
damages. An independent agency determines
the optimal level of pollution with these two
cost functions. Given the level of pollution set
by the agency and the cost functions provided
by the two countries, the polluting (polluted)
country pays a pollution (treatment) tax based
on the cost of clean-up (control) estimated by
the other country and is also required to pay
for the cost of pollution abatement (clean-up)
intheir own country. The advantage of this
approach is that it induces countries to reveal
their “true” value of the environment.2~Unfor-
tunately, because of the problems inherent in
determining the optimal level of pollution as
well as negotiating and implementing such a
proposal, the mutual compensation principle
has never been used.
There are other impediments to reaching
international agreements on environmental use.
For certain types of environmental degradation,
there is debate about how much damage is
actually being done to the environment. An
obvious example of this is global warming.25
Many environmentalists and governments are
concerned that excessive emissions of carbon
dioxide, nitrogen oxide and methane gas from
energy use are irreversibly warming the planet.
Many others, including the U.S. government,
however, feel that the evidence is insufficient at
this point and are unwilling to significantly alter
their environmental policy. Scientific evidence
on global warming is inconclusive. An August
23These countries are the 24 main industrialized countries.
248ee OECO (1976) for an analytic discussion of why this is
true. For more information on the mutual compensation
principle, see the discussion therein.
“For a discussion of the effects of global warming see, for
example, Winters (1992) and Schelling (1992).31, 1991, survey on energy and the environment
in The Economist pointed out one of the difficul-
ties with transfrontier environmental damage
such as global warming: the appropriate policy
may need to be implemented before conclusive
proof that the damage appears, because of the
cumulative effects of some types of environmen-
tal damage over time.
Nevertheless, some international agreements
have been reached (see table 1) and, if the
significant increase in articles, studies and
conferences on transfrontier pollution are any
indication, there will be additional pressures to
find new ways to deal with the increasing
problem of transfrontier pollution.
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One of the main reasons environmental policy
affects trade is because countries are at differ-
ent levels of industrialization and thus have
different income levels, which can cause their
optimal levels of pollution to differ. Because the
interests between high- and low-income coun-
tries may differ, it is important to look more
closely at these so-called North-South issues.2~
Currently the industrialized countries, in
general, are greater polluters than less industri-
alized countries and thus tend to put a relatively
greater demand on worldwide assimilative capac-
ity. One concern heard in developing countries
is that industrial economies, rather than reduc-
ing their own demand for assimilative services,
could impose their environmental standards on
developing countries without any assistance in
paying for them, thereby reducing the opportu-
nity for less-industrialized countries to grow. As
one news commentator suggests:
Developing nations are suspicious that born-
again environmentalists in the North will saddle
them with commitments to regulate pollution,
slow down deforestation, and control popula-
tion growth, all in the name of sustainable de-
velopment. yet won’t follow through with
economic aid to improve their own productivity
and employment. Meanwhile, developed nations
are reluctant to undertake radical domestic [en-
vironmentall policy changes that threaten their
own economic growth.”
Other types of environmental issues have a
particular North-South nature. For example,
many of the world’s nature preserves are in
developing countries in Africa. Currently, trade
in elephant hides and ivory, along with other
endangered species, are prohibited under the
Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species (CITES). At a recent conference
on CITES in Kyoto, Japan, several African coun-
tries argued that their elephant herds are large
enough to be culled without endangering the
species. In addition, they argued, revenue
generated by the sale of ivory and other elephant
products is needed to fund future preservation.
Here, the interest of the industrialized
countries, who do not have a native elephant
population, is to protect an endangered species.
The African countries, however, face a tradeoff
between the benefits of protecting the species
and the loss of revenue associated with the pro-
hibition of trade in elephant products.” As a
result, less-industrialized countries are putting
increased pressure on industrialized countries
to help pay for the services they are providing
(such as species diversity).
In March 1992, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the main body
regulating international trade, released a report
entitled “Trade and the Environment” that takes
a non-traditional approach to North-South
problems. One hotly debated issue concerns the
protection of the rainforests, most of which are
located in Latin America.” Industrialized coun-
tries have moved to bar wood imports from
Brazil and Thailand, for example, as a way to
reduce deforestation in those countries. GATT
argues that, rather than barring imports of
wood products (much of which is GAT’I’-illegal),
the industrialized countries should compensate
rainforest countries for providing “carbon ab-
sorption services.”
Although this approach is novel, its advantage
is that poorer countries are assisted with financ-
26For a more complete discussion of North-South issues in
environmental economics, see Walter (1975).
“Walter Truett Anderson, in Walljasper (1992), p. 159.
29flainforests are valued for, among other things, theb ability
to reduce carbon dioxide in the air and for the biological
diversity they contain,
“At the close of the Kyoto conference, the calls for partially
opening trade in elephants and rhinoceroses were ignoredTable 1
Examples of Multilateral Environmental Agreements
with Trade Provisions
Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State. 1933~
Objective to preserve the natural fauna and ‘bra of tno world, particularly of Africa. by
means of national parks and reserves, and by regular’on of hunting and collection of species
Trade Frov’sion: prohb’ts the import ano export of trophies unless the exporter is given a
cerV’icate permitting export Parties shall take measures to control and regulate in eacn of its
territories the ‘nternal import ano export of ttpnies acquirea in a manner not in accord with
nat~onal law (Art. IX~
Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere. 19402
Objective: to preserve all spec!es and genera 0’ native American fauna and flora from extinc-
tion and to preserve areas of extraordinary beauty. strik1’g geological formation or aesthot.c.
histor~c or scentific value.
Trade P’ovis’on provdes ‘or the regulation of trado in protected species by the issuance of
export permits (Art lx)
African convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. 1968~
Objective: to conserve, utilize and develop tne soil, water, floral and faunal resources o~ tne
African cont.nent.
Trace P’ov sion’ for all species. a Party shall regulate trade in and the transport of speci-
mens or trophies, and shah do so in such a manner as to prevent the illegal capture or ki!ling
of these Trade in lrophes and transport of specimens of protectec species shall be subject
to a standa”d author.zation U) additional to that requireo for the hunting. killing, capture or
coJlection: ~.flwhich ndcates the dest~nation.fiil which shall not be given unless they nave
been legally obtained. flv~which shall be examined pnor to exportation. Parties w’ll make the
import and transit of such specimens or trophies subject to tne presentation of the authoriza.
tion requ’red uncer U) and confiscate illegally exported specimens or trophies (Art IX. NOTE:
Parties ae all members of the Organization o4 African Unity.
iru4 eii~rr~iiii.iiciitalrlr’tllrt’tiobl ,0 tililt it (lilt’’ 11111 £4i’01Ji).~iiiicl ‘.iilii ij.it’l,. It) till’ I”’tlilli4 £~0\ (‘l’ilrlltllls
uphlti’ .it till’ i’\JJCIISC üI er)nOlnic cIe~ ElOpllti’Ilt. in l’\t’llUllge liii’ in e.’,trnent il local ell\ iI’lliiIllPhl—
I ins .lpprnarll ako redtli’e~the free—rider tal project’ rllritldiIlg liii’ ptll’rith.~eol laud that
pi’Ohllt’ill thdl i’iiabit’’ intich ol the ~~‘orld to i~hen turned 111(0 en~ ii’oninerital pI’esel’\ e~.
hen’’l it ‘ruin the t’ar’hon ahsiirptiun sen ices
prot uhd h\ riimlorest, and the di~ ersil~ol
5perie~.rn’~tIed In ronnlne’ that art not the
JJI’iillill’\ users at the ent lrunrnellt In addition
hit apprclarh dir’ecti~pr’oterK the I’aintoresls
rallier’ Ili.iti hm’ring certain t\ lies ot wood
1n’tidict’ts iii tin’ !lript’~
1Ili,it doing sri n ill ‘wise .~lP eseill . iiitei’ii~itioii~il iif’l’CCnic’nts do clot
the (‘\j)Ol Ilint i’onlllrle’. to l)i’OU’l’l them £lilt)t\ LI I otii’tti’~ to dlsrrlnlinau’ Lntaln.’l ii’odtit’t~.
(lii tileil’ Jil OdlIt’lilIrl terhnRjtl1’~. I lidel’
Other’ approaches taken io irnprm e em iron— C \ II har’ririg imports her’atlse tilt’ pn)dlIrloll
I1ll’iltLil sl.lild~1l’tis iii lo~~ l’i’—lOt’oIili’. lc’s,.—iri,.Iiislr’i— riit’titod”, cv~&’tI(10 not InteL the .~lanciai(Is oi he
ali,.ed countries inrltide dt’hl—ior—nature Sn LIDs. iulpol’tihig t’oiiiitr~ i’ illegal. IN5 rule ha’. (‘nine
I lere lnreign dc’ht i’ lllli’chZNed b~en~ ir’ommrnenud under Ire reec’ritl~ par’Lirui.ir’l~in light iii the
‘°Fora discussion o# dect-~or.natureswaps and a partia1 I
ot some o’ tiese arrargenonts see Jevl.r (1991)Table 1 (continued)
Examples of Multilateral Environmental Agreements
with Trade Provisions
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. 1973’
Oolect’ve: to protect endangerec species aqa.nst overexploitation through interrational trade
Trade Provisions: trade of species threatened wltn extinction (listed in Appendix U, ano t’ade
in species that may become endangered unless trade ;s strictly regulated Ilisted in Appendix
II). is author-zed by export ano import permts approved by the Scientific Authorit,es of the
Pati~sconcerned fArticies III ano IV) Spec~es that a Party identifies as being subject to
regulation wtn,n ts own uj’isdiction and as requiring international cooperation to controi
trace I hsted in Appendix 1W is suoject to an export pe”m.t authonzeo by the Sc-entif’c
Authority of the Party (Article V~. Art.cie XXIII permits a party to exempt itself from the
r~qu~r~m~nts of the convention with regard to a spec”ic sp’~ces listed in Appendices I. II or
Ill. NOTE: CITES ouilds on a long nistory of controll:ng trace in endangered spec es through
the issuC & export permits It adds tie twist of requinng an import permit for an export per-
mit to be issued. in o’der to prevent circumvention to non-Parties
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer. 1987~
Oblective’ to reduce ~nc eliminate nan-made emissions o ozone-depict ng substances.
Trade Provisions- trade prov!sions affect non-Parties onry. Parties are to ban the -mportation
of controlled substances as o’ January 1. 1991. and bar the export of controlled substances
as of January 1. 1993. Part’es a’e atso to ban tne export of tne relevant tecnnology to non-
Part.es Tie 1990 amendments. which are not in fo’ce, require Parties to ban the importat on
of CF~-contain ng products as of January 1, 1993
SOURCES GATT (i992~and U S. Deparyrient of State (1991;.
‘The signatory countr’es are: Beig urn. Italy. Portugai. Soair. Sweden. United Kingdom. Egypt.
South Africa Unizec Republic of Tanzania and lnd.a. Fm notes ‘egarcing certain counties.
please consult onginal source. 2The s’gnatory ccuntrres are. Un teo States. Argentina Brat I Ch:le. Costa A ca. Denlin:can
Repuetic. Ecuado”. Ei Salvador. Guatemala. Ha t., Mexico. N caragua. Panama. Paraguay
Peru. Surname. Trinidad ard Tobago. Uruguay and Venezjola For nores ega”dng certain
countries please consult origina1 sout~ 1Tne signatory counties are Alger a. Burkina Faso Cameroon. ~cnt”a A’nca’n Repuolic. Con-
go. Djibouti. Egypt. Onana Ivory coast. Kenya. Liberia. Madagascar. Malaw’. Ma!i. Morocco.
Mozamo:que. N’ger Nigera. Rwand~.Senegal Seycnebles. Sudan. Swazitand. Toqo. Tunis:a.
Uganda. United Republic o’ Tanzan a. Za-re and Zamo.a. For notes egarding certa’n coun-
tr.es. please consult original sou”ce 4Tne signatory countries are’ all OECD countries except Greece. Iceland. lreiano and Turkey:
Argentina. Braz-l. Costa Rica. Venezuela. congo. Egypt. United Republ.c o Tanzania. Za’ro.
Z.mbabwe India. lndones,a. Malaysia Union o’ Soviet Socialist Republcs and lsrao, plus 73
othe” develop’ng countr’es For notes regarding certain countr,es and br Appendices I. II and
Ill, please consult original source.
~Thesignatory countries are. All OECD countries except Turkey, Argentina, Braz.l. Mox’co,
Egypt. Kenya, Soutn Af”-ca. Zambia. Maaysia. Tnaiiano. Uniun of Soviet Social st Repuol:cs
Bulgaria. Czechoslovak.a and Hungary. plus 25 other deveioprrg countries Fo” notes regard-
.ng certa n countries, please consult orig:nal source
controversial tuna-do)phin dispute between the
United States and Mexico.”
The justification for prohibiting trade restric-
tions based on the production method is to pre-
vent countries from using such restrictions to
protect domestic industries. Unfortunately,
GATT was not designed to address some of the
more complicated issues of environmental pro-
tection, particularly regarding production
methods that could have transborder or global
31ln this case. the United States barred Mexican tuna
because the process by which it caught tuna killed more
dolphins than is permitted by the United States. According
to GATT, however, the ban was illegal because the fishing
waters in question were not under U.S. jurisdiction. For a
discussion of the tuna-dolphin case, see GATT (1992) or
the original panel report.GATT and the Environment
CVI 1 isa rrr~rItil~iter’al ti-ado agreement ble under GAll’s rules to make access to
Ihat sets the t ules for international trude, ones own market dc’pendcnto nthe dornestit
prot ides a r nechanis Ut liv which to settle ent’irorimental policies or’ practices of the
rude (1 ISpLIt05 a nrcing Louitt tic’s, and conducts cx pot’ting cotintn. “~ As a r’est.ilI, tWO prImax-
multilateral tr,icle nigotiatLons trailed Roundsl screes of conflict hate arisen bE’t\\’et~nen-
to red Lice trade barrie N. ‘till! a greemeiit. ti rontnentat policy a rid GA’i” I’. ‘[‘he first is iiw
hott ever is silent concerning the c’orriplirta- violation of the national treat rnent prOVisicin,
Lions stemniilig from environrru’nta I policies which states that ireign firms producing or’
hat hat e trade effects. ‘I he out artide that selling a pr’ocltiet ill a oun U y’ nitist be treat-
remotely deals with the erit ir’onmc’n L is Ar’tr- ccl the same as a clornesttc firm (i.e., a I oreign
dc XX which lists gene rat e.tcep Iions LU iimn located in another country cannot he
GAl t r’tiles. I‘ncler ;\rticle XX: subject to mores tringent em tronrireutal stan-
sirhic-ct iii liii’ r’c’quirc’rneril that strclr (lards thin a doriiestic firm) the second is
rflcasui’VsiIt’c’ not apjiliect in a tilLit)lic’i’ t-ic,latiotis of’ the tuin—disc-i’uniriatory status
~ hicti tvotild c’oristttutc’ a mt’aniS of ill’’ which states that ari~’trade concession made
hit ‘alt or’ trnjtrstitiabte disc’r’imiriatitnr Er,’- to ~ C;Vj’l’ rrtember’ must be made to all.’3
tiveen cc,unitr’ies u Iu’r’c’ the s,inric’c’oricliti itis for’ example, the trade prot isions of the \fon-
pre~ nil, or’ a dis,guisc’cl restriction oni rrflc’r- trea] Protocol stipulate different trade nreas-
national truck’. nothing ri ttrus,~i~r’n’c’,rn,’nt ur’es lot’ sigti~ttoric’sand non—signatories
“hall Is’ c’ilnstr ut’d to pr’c’t cut the anon-
tion lii’ eiriur’ct’nrrc’nit bt ann c’onitrac tirig lother’tt’ise known as most—favored nattc,n
t)11r’til.s of tlrc’iqil’e~ ..lit’t’P.SScII’V to protect (MIX) statusl. which is a \ rolatton of lion—
human. aninurl or plant tile or health.1 cliscr’iniination.
(‘rider- (I A II’. ccit mid Cs carl regulate ‘l’here are set era I \t’at’ s that ciivitorimerita]
polluting iitins in their’ otvn ountrv as tong issties could he explicitly addressed in CVI’!
as no distinct jari is iiiade between domes tic ‘the ru es could be amencled , fcn’ cxiirnple. to
and foreign-ott tied fir’irts. lii fact nothing iii set u papenalty st-stern for count r’ies that are
G~Vl 1 r’es trict s a governmerit’s nutonoirrv in ~ietow some ag;’eect-ti pan level of erivironmert-
such things Ll’~taxa lion . ritgtitation and subsi- tat st andar’ds. ‘l’his requires acceptance by two-
dies as long as fore go and riomest tc I trots thirds of the contracting paflies Iin ni ucli
are t I‘cated ec{ Lid1k. contit ties it thereby I,ecomes effective) and is
n r‘egai’d t ci pci]lutitt g (‘onstittiption goods effec(ftc in the cit her’ countries as t lies’ accept
Ic’ .g. . (‘an’s th~i t p n’ochIfl’ all ~0ll Lition), it is Idie amendment . ‘f’h dii lieu It\ witti this a
~ilso GA’l”t—lc’giil to place controls on these proacFi is that a sufficient number of rric’riiber
prod tic ts or r’equ Ir’c’ ROllu Rnin cont rol dcc icc’s ~ Ith~must agree to the ‘acceptat) Ic’’’ start-
Istnc Ii :rs cata vt rc curt yer’ter’sl, as long as ciard s. Even if ther-e ar-c differ’e nt proyisioris
hc’se I egu Ialions ar-c applied ccl ua1k tO for’ dcc eloping arid inchistriaflied c’ountlies.
clornestic~i lIt: produced and inrported agreenrent is still tikc’tv Icr be clitt’icLtlt.
produt’ls. ‘l’hft’~c’regulations teticl to be —
a pplic’d eqiuilly . causing I en er trade-mt-ta I c’cI Artot her por’sihuliIv is that specif it’ waivers
pr’obletns with coristrrrrption pollution. rout’ be granted to alt 01’ some of the signiato—
According lii the r’ec’c’itt GA rI report cnn iv countries. this waiver n-equti’es a tn 0-
the cut ironriient. ‘ lii priricipic-. it is riot possi- thir’d~major’itt ot those tciting. as tong as the
‘GATT (1966) p 37
‘GATT (1992~.p ID.
~Tnere are, however, GATT-sanctioned exceptions to
nondiscrimination, such as the Generalized System of
Preferences for develop’ng countrres15
nlujor’it\ c’onirlnn’isc’s at Ic’a’~thaIl cit thc’ coo— issues in ‘i Im-anisparent. niuihil1tten LII u at- anti1
I i’ac’l ing parties. \\‘aiyt’t’s lion c’’ er, ar’c’ mt Lint’ tint u’,ccl to mast~lir’otn’c’tiumus[ pcilit’In’s.
assummriecl tin he Iong-tei’nt sottitic,nts, hint
-. - . I he c’cnriren’mn that mmncntnt atn’d tin’ m cm-cot
c’\ct’lntlonis liii’ a Irntiiti’cl ttmc. — .-
II s[tic._t rs that I ‘axle 1itnltr’ies ItIsl1trt~ctlit’
CAt’ I could aI”u clan-itt- whelhc’n- \Il-\ arid a trading par’tniem’’s c’nivi’onniicntal policies ~it’c
national Ii’eatnttn’nit. tt hic’li m’edltnin’n’s ‘iItral tm-rat- cnftc-it sinirpi’. ariothn’i’ tt at to IiI’alec’t a clonic’s—
nilt’nit trim’ ‘‘likc- In’odunrts.’ considc’m’ pr’oclcmrts tic inctiistrt’ al tirc’ tnpc’risr’ of its fcn’eigni
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cnn n’onnm’nital standards a” ‘like pm’cndinc’ts. ‘ If’ tikn’lt uttcniipt tin mrmt~n’c’xplic’it ‘tiles alirnint
not tlrt’_t ran urn sulijcr’t lo cli f’f’c’r’c’nI n’rgula c’nvnm’onmmental uiolc’ to In n’c’vcrtt diftcrtnrrc’s
tionts ‘l’hc aclt aotagc- of ill UI’ tIie~c’up- mt tht’sc’ pcniic’it’s ft-our ht’inig tnsi’cI a~ a non
pn’ouc’hn’~is thai thc-~~ncIdr’n’-,’, c’ot in’onttrc’ntal It pe oI non-Rim-Hf han’n’icn -
effects.32 For a discussion of GATT regulations
and environmental protection, see the shaded
insert at left.
GATT’s recently released report on the
environment attempts to address some of these
issues, Some have suggested, in addition, that
GATT focus the next round of talks on environ-
mental issues (assuming the current “Uruguay
Round” of talks is successfully completed),~~ The
United Nations-sponsored “Earth Summit” in Rio
Dc Janeiro scheduled for this spring is also an
attempt to increase international cooperation on
protecting the environment, particularly in
regard to North-South issues,
This article examines the role of environmen-
tal policy on international trade. Environmental
policy is justified because of the nature of exter-
nalities associated with using the environment.
When the divergence between the social and
private costs of using the environment is
ignored, polluting activities receive an implicit
subsidy. Environmental regulations may change
international trade, but enhance social welfare
by removing this subsidy. The optimal amount
of environmental protection, however, can
differ significantly across countries because of
differences in preferences, income and assimila-
tive capacities.
One important concern is that countries
will use environmental policies as an excuse to
establish protectionist policies. As environmental
protection and environmental use take on a
more transnational nature and the assimilative
capacity is reduced worldwide, new agreements
will have to be designed to both protect scarce
resources and protect countries from being dis-
criminated against because of how they choose
to use their environmental endowments domes-
tically. As the recent GATT report suggested,
however, it is possible to protect the environ-
ment without distorting trade flows, Thus, free
trade and environmental policy are not mutually
exclusive but can work together to encourage
both economic growth and environmental quaff-
ty worldwide,
S2For a comprehensive discussion of the application of en-
vironmental exceptions under GATT. see Charnovitz
(1991), and Sorsa (1992).
33For an additional discussion of why GAIT should nook
more closely at environmental regulation, see Petersmann
(1991)
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